Eagle Football Holdings Bidco

Latest Update: Investment Written Off.

July 29, 2026

Investment Written Off

Upgraded From CCR 5 To CCR 3

Removed As An Important Underperformer

We've written 4 earlier articles about Eagle Football, and the contentious relationship between its now-former owner and Ares Management which provided much of the junior capital financing. See below. This article will be the last because Ares Capital (ARCC), which had advanced $72mn as of the IQ 2026 and valued its position at $14mn has now booked a realized loss on the investment of ($70mn) in the IIQ 2026. Written-off is subordinated debt , preferred and equity. All that is left is a $2.6mn equity stake, valued at par.

As we noted in our earlier article, the company has been placed "under administration" in the UK and ARCC is recognizing that this foray into financing sports conglomerates is essentially over.

We are upgrading the company to a rating of 3, and have to wonder if even the $2.6mn remaining in equity can be counted on. Given the low FMV this is no longer an Important Underperformer and will be removed ftom our database.

Crystal Ball

Loss Summary

June 1, 2026

Remains Rated CCR 5 And A Major Underperformer

The saga at this soccer/football conglomerate continues, as do the harsh words between its owner and Ares Capital (ARCC), one of its key lenders. We've written multiple times about this epic contest before, most recently on March 2, 2026. A few weeks later, the company was involuntary placed "under administration" in the United Kingdom by ARCC. This triggered colorful statements from the company's owner John Textor, aimed at the Ares folks.

Eagle Football in a statement said that it was “‘gravely offended by the unilateral and predatory decision’ of Ares to ‘break apart a financially viable multi-club business’ that Textor claims has turned ‘insolvent clubs into sporting success stories’”.

The situation is highly complex as many assets sit outside the jurisdiction of the UK insolvency administrator which is reportedly seeking buyers for the 3 football clubs Eagle owns.

For ARCC, though, the situation seems pretty dire because its investment is at a second lien level or in equity. Another BDC, which has more exposure in dollar terms, is non-traded. Apollo Debt Solutions BDC, with $177mn outstanding. Its loan to the company, though, is in a first lien position and valued at par.

By contrast, ARCC's $72mn invested has been written down to $14mn from $24mn the quarter before. A year ago, ARCC had advanced $87mn and valued its position at $85mn. In the interim, some of the debt was repaid when Eagle was forced to sell one of its crown jewels, Premier League club Crystal Palace, whose mascot is... an eagle. The proceeds reduced the debt modestly, but there seems to be little else of value left. The BDC Credit Reporter has long projected an eventual loss in the 75%-100% range, and that continues to be on the cards. Maybe there will be lingering litigation between Textor and Ares as well.

We're not quite done with this credit story, but this foray into sports lending - like many others - has gone drastically wrong for ARCC.

For the moment, though, we continue to rate the company a 5 on our 5 point scale and a Major Underperformer, given that total BDC FMV comes to $186mn. However, $172mn of that is held by Apollo high on the balance sheet.

March 2, 2026

Remains Rated CCR 5 And An Important Underperformer

A few weeks ago, we wrote this in the BDC Credit Reporter:

At a time when many are worrying about Private Credit's loans to software companies, the BDC Credit Reporter is concerned about the increasing enthusiasm for investing in sports franchises worldwide. This is a new area for leveraged lending and we question whether it's a good idea. A case in point is the nearly quarter of a billion dollars committed in debt and equity in Eagle Football Holdings.

Bloomberg has recently published a behind-the-scenes article about the relationship between Ares Management, the external advisor to Ares Capital (ARCC), the only BDC lender to Eagle Football, and its owner. We also learned about many of the financial machinations occurring behind the scenes. Nothing we learned diminished our skepticism about sports franchise lending.

We learned about the company's apparently mercurial owner, John Textor, and his uncomfortable relationship with Ares and with the company's new President, Michele Kang, who has taken the businessman's place in that role. Apparently, Kang also invested capital in the business, and her appointment was demanded by Ares as part of a rescue package. The relationship between the owner and the new President appears not to be going smoothly:

But Textor, used to having a hands-on role in his investments, has been unable to let go. While Textor praised Kang’s “remarkable leadership” in helping Lyon avoid relegation in a statement at the time, his tone has shifted in more recent correspondence. He’s accused Ares and Kang of operating a “shadow board” at Lyon and running it in a way that disadvantages Eagle’s other teams...The American has also filed a complaint with Autorité des marchés financiers, France’s markets regulator, claiming Ares and Kang have not been transparent with him and other stakeholders. A spokesperson for Textor said he had sent a formal demand to Ares and Kang to “submit all meeting minutes and decisions to the AMF.”

ARCC is clearly on the way out. As we've noted, most of its debt has been placed on non-accrual, and the small amounts of additional capital that have been advanced to the company in the form of loans (treated as "performing") are at an interest rate of 20%, albeit payable in PIK form. Moreover, the BDC has written down its total investment by ($48mn) from its $72mn cost, most of which occurred in 2025. In fact, last year, this investment was the second-largest unrealized loss to a company booked in the year. The current value is $24mn.

Textor is talking about refinancing the company with a new lender, which will probably be music to ARCC's ears. However, as far as we know, that has not happened, and we continue to estimate that ARCC could face a 75%-100% loss on the investment. For a BDC of its size, this would be a modest loss, even in a worst-case. However, this ongoing episode does underscore that sports franchise investing/lending, which Ares and other asset managers have embraced with alacrity, may not be an ideal way to branch out of the traditional Private Credit marketplace.

February 12, 2026

Remains Rated CCR 5 And An Important Underperformer

At a time when many are worrying about Private Credit's loans to software companies, the BDC Credit Reporter is concerned about the increasing enthusiasm for investing in sports franchises worldwide. This is a new area for leveraged lending and we question whether it's a good idea. A case in point is the nearly quarter of a billion dollars committed in debt and equity in Eagle Football Holdings, which we wrote about a few weeks ago when some of its debt was placec on non-accrual by one of its BDC lenders - Ares Capital (ARCC). Its other lender is non-traded Apollo Debt Solutions which has the majority of the exposure but all in first lien debt, still performing at the end of the IIIQ 2025.

ARCC - by contrast - is in the junior debt and owns shares and warrants. That equity has been written to zero and most of the junior debt is non-performing. In a sign of credit stress, 2 tranches of debt with a total cost of $1.7mn that is performing pays an interest rate of 20.0% (good money if you can collect it). The interest is due, though, in pay-in-kind (PIK) form. We also note ARCC's exposure increased in the IVQ 2025 even as the BDC continued to write down its investments. At the end of 2025, this was how ARCC's exposure lined up:

That FMV is down from $37.7mn last quarter. (BTW, a footnote of 8 means non-accruing).

We don't know what has worsened between the latest quarters but our initial estimate that ARCC might lose 75%-100% of its investment continues to seem reasonable. In a "realization event" of some sort, the junior capital could lose everything. It's not an unusual occurrence.

We'll be interested to see how the first lien debt gets marked but as of now - according to Solve's database - Apollo Debt Solutions has not reported.

The company remains rated 5 and is a Major Important Underperformer given there seems to be a combined FMV north of $200mn.

November 30, 2025

Downgraded From CCR 3 to CCR 5

Added As Important Underperformer

For some reason asset managers are excited about the prospect of financing sports teams. To our mind that seems one of the less attractive corners of the market given the high valuations usually involved and a host of other issues. Yet, here we are with Eagle Football Holdings being financed by Ares Capital's (ARCC) external manager Ares Management since 2022. The financial arrangement is complex and involves multiple funds controlled by Ares, including $69mn (as of the IIIQ 2025) poinied up by ARCC itself.

We won't get into the entire credit relationship between the asset manager and the soccer/football holding company, but for a useful summary, click here. All ARCC shareholders need to know is that the company was rated 3 on our 5 point scale through the IIQ 2025. However, in the IIIQ 2025, most of the $65mn debt owed to ARCC was placed on non-accrual, and discounted in value by (37%)-(43%). In the prior quarter, the debt was discounted from 0% to (15%). $4mn in an equity stake remained valued at zero.

The ($18mn) unrealized depreciation booked this quarter was the second largest one for ARCC. The good news is that the sale of the company's stake in Crystal Palace - whose mascot is an eagle - appears to be responsible for a partial repayment of outstandings which dropped from $94mn to the current cost of $69mn detailed above.We are creating a Company File for the company and assuming the ultimate loss might well reach into the 50%-75% range for ARCC. That's partly because ARCC's debt in the business sits low on the totem pole - a "mezzanine" loan, which from the outset was priced at a very high rate which peaked at 19.00% - albeit all in pay-in-kind form.

The company is now rated 5 and added to the Important Underperformers list. Given ARCC's capital base even the potential eventual loss of ($50mn)plus won't be too impactful. Still, the episode - which is still playing out - is a reminder that "private credit" is spreading out way beyond its historical boundaries. Unfortunately, with new frontiers private credit is having to deal with new risks - in this case not very successfully.